We will see it from an example of the thought of Emmanuel Kant (1724-1804) on education. Let us start by recalling some of these digital issues that current events force us to consider. With an eye to Kant’s work, a philosopher and a sociologist argue that the Uber project robs drivers of their dignity. Что любопытно, Эммануэль Макрон говорит об этом сейчас, когда реальна перспектива возвращения к власти в США Дональда Трампа. Впервые президент Франции Эммануэль Макрон принял участие в заседании комитета по поиску решений для легальной досрочной смерти. "Я глубоко убежден – и это отвечает. Et l'activité mentale, Filosofia, Kant (Emmanuel). Etudes.
Advance: концепция Макрона о воинственной и сильной Европе ошибочна
Писатель Марк Мэнсон рассказал об этическом принципе, на котором базируется философия Канта — мыслителя, чьи идеи актуальны до сих пор. Иммануил Кант – немецкий философ, основал немецкую классическую философию, жил в эпоху Просвещения и романтизма. Reform of institutions: Emmanuel Macron receives François Hollande at the Élysée.
Immanuel Kant and Nazism
emmanuelle_kant. Архив. Фотографии. Blog grant promo. Recommend this entry Has been recommended Send news. Новости компаний. Лоран Канте родился в 1961 году в семье школьных учителей, киноискусство он изучал сначала в Марселе, а потом — в парижской Высшей школе кинематографистов.
Кант Иммануил
| Иммануил Кант | Иммануил Кант — самый русский из европейских и самый европейский из русских философов. Он родился и всю жизнь работал в Кенигсберге — сегодня это Калининград, несколько лет. |
| Emmanuel Kant pictures and photos | With an eye to Kant’s work, a philosopher and a sociologist argue that the Uber project robs drivers of their dignity. |
| Я живу в Калининграде. Как мы отпраздновали День рождения Иммануила Канта? С вдохновением... | В рамках международного Кантовского конгресса в Калининграде инициаторы развития «Балтийской платформы» – ИМЭМО РАН, МГИМО МИД России, БФУ имени И. Канта при. |
Я живу в Калининграде. Как мы отпраздновали День рождения Иммануила Канта? С вдохновением...
Активировать образ мыслителя следует, назвав ученое звание и прибавив «Здравствуйте» или «Добрый день». Во-вторых , не стоит задавать ему вопросы, пока внизу горит красная полоса-бегунок — кант в это время размышляет, копаясь в своем выдающемся искусственном интеллекте. Алексей Быков, руководитель цифрового экспоната «Беседа с Кантом»: «Встречаемся с разными сложностями из-за того, что искусственный интеллект работает с библиотеками распознавания речи с открытым кодом. Иногда бывают у нас сбои из-за этого. Мы его постоянно дорабатываем». Что точно не нуждается в доработке уже сейчас — это фразы, которые использует цифровой Иммануил Кант во время беседы.
Twenge is to ban cellphones in class, which would improve the quality of relationships between people. Kant would undoubtedly add that this would also facilitate learning and would say how. Kant and the educational benefits of immobility Kant is such an important name in so many areas of philosophy that one might forget that he was also interested in education. One of his ideas concerns the importance of keeping still for children.
Let us translate: through this window created by immobility and listening, and by the attention it allows, ideas can come to their senses. This idea obviously raises important questions and debates about the nature and role of authority in education. This is because the means discipline here seem to contradict the intended end freedom and autonomy. But let us leave these questions aside and transpose what Kant said in the XVIIIe century in our time and to the infinite and so irresistible stimuli that cellphones and social networks constantly provoke.
One can easily see in this an immense danger for the very practice of transmitting and understanding ideas and knowledge, and for the formation of work habits. A danger so great that the ban on cellphones in the classroom, especially for the youngest, can be considered a good idea.
Только учеба. Потом умирает отец, денег как не было, так и нет. Начинаются частные уроки, и ради этого он выезжает из Кенигсберга. Позже покидать родной город он пытаться не будет. Будет бороться за место профессора, и вся история с войной Пруссии и России особенно его не затронет. Он даже письмо Екатерине Второй напишет, с просьбой о месте в университете. Не заразитесь женской логикой Он дважды собирался жениться и не собрался. У него изначально было слабое здоровье, но он прожил почти 80 лет.
Он был на званых вечерах, даже блистал, хотя все считали его не очень красивым. Впрочем, и званые вечера были весьма провинциальны, а одна из дам, почтившая своим вниманием Канта, писала ему письма с орфографическими ошибками. У нее ничего особенного не вышло, и Кант прослыл женоненавистником. Что подтверждал и в высказываниях, называя брак рабством. Женщин же он считал существами, не способными логически мыслить. Рецепт один — отойти в сторону, чтобы не заразиться. Был момент, когда Кант в Кенигсберге оказался практически рок-звездой. Его работы мало кто мог прочесть и осмыслить, но это добавляло загадочности персонажу. В городе его знали все, и все делали вид, что понимают хоть что-нибудь. С другой стороны, если уж Генрих Гейне, которому было семь лет, когда Кант умер, так сильно спустя годы реагировал на упоминание философских трудов чудака из Кенигсберга не любил Гейне «Критику чистого разума», что тут поделаешь?
График не на фиг Он был узнаваем. Человек, ненавидевший дневник в гимназии и самокопание, придумал для себя график. График, практически исключавший вмешательства извне. Как ни странно, этот график как раз извне был особенно интересен: выход из дома в определенный час на прогулку по определенному маршруту. Те, кто в дом были вхожи, знали и другие правила. В пять утра встать после семичасового сна, надеть колпак, а сверху — маленькую треугольную шляпу. Работать до семи в кабинете.
This, coupled with the claim that we experience only appearances, makes transcendental idealism a form of phenomenalism on this interpretation, because it reduces the objects of experience to mental representations. All of our experiences — all of our perceptions of objects and events in space, even those objects and events themselves, and all non-spatial but still temporal thoughts and feelings — fall into the class of appearances that exist in the mind of human perceivers. These appearances cut us off entirely from the reality of things in themselves, which are non-spatial and non-temporal. In principle we cannot know how things in themselves affect our senses, because our experience and knowledge is limited to the world of appearances constructed by and in the mind. Things in themselves are therefore a sort of theoretical posit, whose existence and role are required by the theory but are not directly verifiable. The main problems with the two-objects interpretation are philosophical. Most readers of Kant who have interpreted his transcendental idealism in this way have been — often very — critical of it, for reasons such as the following: First, at best Kant is walking a fine line in claiming on the one hand that we can have no knowledge about things in themselves, but on the other hand that we know that things in themselves exist, that they affect our senses, and that they are non-spatial and non-temporal. At worst his theory depends on contradictory claims about what we can and cannot know about things in themselves. Some versions of this objection proceed from premises that Kant rejects. But Kant denies that appearances are unreal: they are just as real as things in themselves but are in a different metaphysical class. But just as Kant denies that things in themselves are the only or privileged reality, he also denies that correspondence with things in themselves is the only kind of truth. Empirical judgments are true just in case they correspond with their empirical objects in accordance with the a priori principles that structure all possible human experience. But the fact that Kant can appeal in this way to an objective criterion of empirical truth that is internal to our experience has not been enough to convince some critics that Kant is innocent of an unacceptable form of skepticism, mainly because of his insistence on our irreparable ignorance about things in themselves. The role of things in themselves, on the two-object interpretation, is to affect our senses and thereby to provide the sensory data from which our cognitive faculties construct appearances within the framework of our a priori intuitions of space and time and a priori concepts such as causality. But if there is no space, time, change, or causation in the realm of things in themselves, then how can things in themselves affect us? Transcendental affection seems to involve a causal relation between things in themselves and our sensibility. If this is simply the way we unavoidably think about transcendental affection, because we can give positive content to this thought only by employing the concept of a cause, while it is nevertheless strictly false that things in themselves affect us causally, then it seems not only that we are ignorant of how things in themselves really affect us. It seems, rather, to be incoherent that things in themselves could affect us at all if they are not in space or time. On this view, transcendental idealism does not distinguish between two classes of objects but rather between two different aspects of one and the same class of objects. That is, appearances are aspects of the same objects that also exist in themselves. So, on this reading, appearances are not mental representations, and transcendental idealism is not a form of phenomenalism. One version treats transcendental idealism as a metaphysical theory according to which objects have two aspects in the sense that they have two sets of properties: one set of relational properties that appear to us and are spatial and temporal, and another set of intrinsic properties that do not appear to us and are not spatial or temporal Langton 1998. This property-dualist interpretation faces epistemological objections similar to those faced by the two-objects interpretation, because we are in no better position to acquire knowledge about properties that do not appear to us than we are to acquire knowledge about objects that do not appear to us. Moreover, this interpretation also seems to imply that things in themselves are spatial and temporal, since appearances have spatial and temporal properties, and on this view appearances are the same objects as things in themselves. But Kant explicitly denies that space and time are properties of things in themselves. A second version of the two-aspects theory departs more radically from the traditional two-objects interpretation by denying that transcendental idealism is at bottom a metaphysical theory. Instead, it interprets transcendental idealism as a fundamentally epistemological theory that distinguishes between two standpoints on the objects of experience: the human standpoint, from which objects are viewed relative to epistemic conditions that are peculiar to human cognitive faculties namely, the a priori forms of our sensible intuition ; and the standpoint of an intuitive intellect, from which the same objects could be known in themselves and independently of any epistemic conditions Allison 2004. Human beings cannot really take up the latter standpoint but can form only an empty concept of things as they exist in themselves by abstracting from all the content of our experience and leaving only the purely formal thought of an object in general. So transcendental idealism, on this interpretation, is essentially the thesis that we are limited to the human standpoint, and the concept of a thing in itself plays the role of enabling us to chart the boundaries of the human standpoint by stepping beyond them in abstract but empty thought. One criticism of this epistemological version of the two-aspects theory is that it avoids the objections to other interpretations by attributing to Kant a more limited project than the text of the Critique warrants. There are passages that support this reading. The transcendental deduction The transcendental deduction is the central argument of the Critique of Pure Reason and one of the most complex and difficult texts in the history of philosophy. Given its complexity, there are naturally many different ways of interpreting the deduction. The goal of the transcendental deduction is to show that we have a priori concepts or categories that are objectively valid, or that apply necessarily to all objects in the world that we experience. To show this, Kant argues that the categories are necessary conditions of experience, or that we could not have experience without the categories. For they then are related necessarily and a priori to objects of experience, since only by means of them can any object of experience be thought at all. The transcendental deduction of all a priori concepts therefore has a principle toward which the entire investigation must be directed, namely this: that they must be recognized as a priori conditions of the possibility of experiences whether of the intuition that is encountered in them, or of the thinking. Concepts that supply the objective ground of the possibility of experience are necessary just for that reason. Here Kant claims, against the Lockean view, that self-consciousness arises from combining or synthesizing representations with one another regardless of their content. In short, Kant has a formal conception of self-consciousness rather than a material one. Since no particular content of my experience is invariable, self-consciousness must derive from my experience having an invariable form or structure, and consciousness of the identity of myself through all of my changing experiences must consist in awareness of the formal unity and law-governed regularity of my experience. The continuous form of my experience is the necessary correlate for my sense of a continuous self. There are at least two possible versions of the formal conception of self-consciousness: a realist and an idealist version. On the realist version, nature itself is law-governed and we become self-conscious by attending to its law-governed regularities, which also makes this an empiricist view of self-consciousness. The idea of an identical self that persists throughout all of our experience, on this view, arises from the law-governed regularity of nature, and our representations exhibit order and regularity because reality itself is ordered and regular. Kant rejects this realist view and embraces a conception of self-consciousness that is both formal and idealist. According to Kant, the formal structure of our experience, its unity and law-governed regularity, is an achievement of our cognitive faculties rather than a property of reality in itself. Our experience has a constant form because our mind constructs experience in a law-governed way. In other words, even if reality in itself were law-governed, its laws could not simply migrate over to our mind or imprint themselves on us while our mind is entirely passive. We must exercise an active capacity to represent the world as combined or ordered in a law-governed way, because otherwise we could not represent the world as law-governed even if it were law-governed in itself. Moreover, this capacity to represent the world as law-governed must be a priori because it is a condition of self-consciousness, and we would already have to be self-conscious in order to learn from our experience that there are law-governed regularities in the world. So it is necessary for self-consciousness that we exercise an a priori capacity to represent the world as law-governed. But this would also be sufficient for self-consciousness if we could exercise our a priori capacity to represent the world as law-governed even if reality in itself were not law-governed. In that case, the realist and empiricist conception of self-consciousness would be false, and the formal idealist view would be true. Self-consciousness for Kant therefore involves a priori knowledge about the necessary and universal truth expressed in this principle of apperception, and a priori knowledge cannot be based on experience. The next condition is that self-consciousness requires me to represent an objective world distinct from my subjective representations — that is, distinct from my thoughts about and sensations of that objective world. Kant uses this connection between self-consciousness and objectivity to insert the categories into his argument. In order to be self-conscious, I cannot be wholly absorbed in the contents of my perceptions but must distinguish myself from the rest of the world. But if self-consciousness is an achievement of the mind, then how does the mind achieve this sense that there is a distinction between the I that perceives and the contents of its perceptions? According to Kant, the mind achieves this sense by distinguishing representations that necessarily belong together from representations that are not necessarily connected but are merely associated in a contingent way. Imagine a house that is too large to fit into your visual field from your vantage point near its front door. Now imagine that you walk around the house, successively perceiving each of its sides. Eventually you perceive the entire house, but not all at once, and you judge that each of your representations of the sides of the house necessarily belong together as sides of one house and that anyone who denied this would be mistaken. But now imagine that you grew up in this house and associate a feeling of nostalgia with it. You would not judge that representations of this house are necessarily connected with feelings of nostalgia. That is, you would not think that other people seeing the house for the first time would be mistaken if they denied that it is connected with nostalgia, because you recognize that this house is connected with nostalgia for you but not necessarily for everyone. The point here is not that we must successfully identify which representations necessarily belong together and which are merely associated contingently, but rather that to be self-conscious we must at least make this general distinction between objective and merely subjective connections of representations. That is the aim of the copula is in them: to distinguish the objective unity of given representations from the subjective. Kant is speaking here about the mental act of judging that results in the formation of a judgment. We must represent an objective world in order to distinguish ourselves from it, and we represent an objective world by judging that some representations necessarily belong together. Moreover, recall from 4. It follows that objective connections in the world cannot simply imprint themselves on our mind. The understanding constructs experience by providing the a priori rules, or the framework of necessary laws, in accordance with which we judge representations to be objective. These rules are the pure concepts of the understanding or categories, which are therefore conditions of self-consciousness, since they are rules for judging about an objective world, and self-consciousness requires that we distinguish ourselves from an objective world. Kant identifies the categories in what he calls the metaphysical deduction, which precedes the transcendental deduction. But since categories are not mere logical functions but instead are rules for making judgments about objects or an objective world, Kant arrives at his table of categories by considering how each logical function would structure judgments about objects within our spatio-temporal forms of intuition. For example, he claims that categorical judgments express a logical relation between subject and predicate that corresponds to the ontological relation between substance and accident; and the logical form of a hypothetical judgment expresses a relation that corresponds to cause and effect. Taken together with this argument, then, the transcendental deduction argues that we become self-conscious by representing an objective world of substances that interact according to causal laws. To see why this further condition is required, consider that so far we have seen why Kant holds that we must represent an objective world in order to be self-conscious, but we could represent an objective world even if it were not possible to relate all of our representations to this objective world. For all that has been said so far, we might still have unruly representations that we cannot relate in any way to the objective framework of our experience. So I must be able to relate any given representation to an objective world in order for it to count as mine. On the other hand, self-consciousness would also be impossible if I represented multiple objective worlds, even if I could relate all of my representations to some objective world or other. In that case, I could not become conscious of an identical self that has, say, representation 1 in space-time A and representation 2 in space-time B. It may be possible to imagine disjointed spaces and times, but it is not possible to represent them as objectively real. So self-consciousness requires that I can relate all of my representations to a single objective world. The reason why I must represent this one objective world by means of a unified and unbounded space-time is that, as Kant argued in the Transcendental Aesthetic, space and time are the pure forms of human intuition. If we had different forms of intuition, then our experience would still have to constitute a unified whole in order for us to be self-conscious, but this would not be a spatio-temporal whole. So Kant distinguishes between space and time as pure forms of intuition, which belong solely to sensibility; and the formal intuitions of space and time or space-time , which are unified by the understanding B160—161. These formal intuitions are the spatio-temporal whole within which our understanding constructs experience in accordance with the categories. So Kant concludes on this basis that the understanding is the true law-giver of nature. Our understanding does not provide the matter or content of our experience, but it does provide the basic formal structure within which we experience any matter received through our senses. He holds that there is a single fundamental principle of morality, on which all specific moral duties are based. He calls this moral law as it is manifested to us the categorical imperative see 5. The moral law is a product of reason, for Kant, while the basic laws of nature are products of our understanding. There are important differences between the senses in which we are autonomous in constructing our experience and in morality. The moral law does not depend on any qualities that are peculiar to human nature but only on the nature of reason as such, although its manifestation to us as a categorical imperative as a law of duty reflects the fact that the human will is not necessarily determined by pure reason but is also influenced by other incentives rooted in our needs and inclinations; and our specific duties deriving from the categorical imperative do reflect human nature and the contingencies of human life.
Scholz “forbade” Putin from quoting Immanuel Kant
Дынкиным в ходе проведения российско-белорусского форума «Рубежи Союзного государства» , организованного в октябре 2022 г. В 2022-2023 г. Проект направлен на развитие научно-экспертного и общественного диалога между странами большого Балтийско-Скандинавского региона: странами ЕС — с одной стороны и Россией и Белоруссией — с другой, с привлечением экспертов из других стран и регионов мира. Главная цель — возобновление научно-экспертного диалога по «второму треку» по широкому перечню тематик между российскими и европейскими учеными: от социальных, экономических, экологических, культурных до проблем военной и невоенной безопасности.
Мы не можем быть единственными, кто соблюдает правила. Мы слишком наивны", — отметил он. Что касается его заявления, сделанного в феврале, когда он не исключил отправки войск на Украину, то вчера он сказал, что "стратегическая двусмысленность" является важной частью нового геополитического порядка. Мы не просто маленькая часть Запада", — подчеркнул президент Франции. Также, по его словам, одна из серьезнейших угроз для существования Европы — ее собственная деморализация. Мы не такие, как остальные.
Мы никогда не должны забывать об этом. Европа не просто кусок земли — это концепция человечества", — подчеркнул Эммануэль Макрон. Россия вынуждает Макрона вновь призывать к "европейскому кредиту" ради инвестиций в вооружениеВо время выступления в Сорбонне Эммануэль Макрон затронул вопрос безопасности Европы из-за "угрозы со стороны России", пишет Le Figaro. Французский президент в очередной раз громко заявил, что континенту необходимо вооружаться. Читатели издания не оценили эту воинственность — и кое-чем Макрона пристыдили. Речь об идеологии, которая, как ее ни маскировали, по своей сути является опасной, ксенофобской, империалистической и милитаристской.
Многочисленные американские войны наглядно демонстрируют последствия этой идеологии. Эммануэль Макрон, по-видимому, хотел бы скопировать модель и перенести ее на Европу. При этом он понимает, что вассальный статус Европы в отношениях с США, — серьезное препятствие к реализации этой задумки. Правда, как я уже писал, вассальный статус не мешает Макрону, когда, по его мнению, не время возмущаться, и движут им в эти моменты исключительно французские, а не европейские интересы. Кроме того, слова о том, что Европа "особенная", конечно, справедливы, но не в том смысле или не только в том, о котором говорит французский президент. Ведь Европа — колыбель колониализма, тяжелой и жестокой эксплуатации остального мира.
Given sensory data, our understanding constructs experience according to these a priori laws. Practical philosophy is about how the world ought to be ibid. Its highest principle is the moral law, from which we derive duties that command how we ought to act in specific situations.
Kant also claims that reflection on our moral duties and our need for happiness leads to the thought of an ideal world, which he calls the highest good see section 6. Given how the world is theoretical philosophy and how it ought to be practical philosophy , we aim to make the world better by constructing or realizing the highest good. In theoretical philosophy, we use our categories and forms of intuition to construct a world of experience or nature.
In practical philosophy, we use the moral law to construct the idea of a moral world or a realm of ends that guides our conduct 4:433 , and ultimately to transform the natural world into the highest good. Theoretical philosophy deals with appearances, to which our knowledge is strictly limited; and practical philosophy deals with things in themselves, although it does not give us knowledge about things in themselves but only provides rational justification for certain beliefs about them for practical purposes. The three traditional topics of Leibniz-Wolffian special metaphysics were rational psychology, rational cosmology, and rational theology, which dealt, respectively, with the human soul, the world-whole, and God.
In the part of the Critique of Pure Reason called the Transcendental Dialectic, Kant argues against the Leibniz-Wolffian view that human beings are capable of a priori knowledge in each of these domains, and he claims that the errors of Leibniz-Wolffian metaphysics are due to an illusion that has its seat in the nature of human reason itself. According to Kant, human reason necessarily produces ideas of the soul, the world-whole, and God; and these ideas unavoidably produce the illusion that we have a priori knowledge about transcendent objects corresponding to them. This is an illusion, however, because in fact we are not capable of a priori knowledge about any such transcendent objects.
Nevertheless, Kant attempts to show that these illusory ideas have a positive, practical use. He thus reframes Leibniz-Wolffian special metaphysics as a practical science that he calls the metaphysics of morals. If this was not within his control at the time, then, while it may be useful to punish him in order to shape his behavior or to influence others, it nevertheless would not be correct to say that his action was morally wrong.
Moral rightness and wrongness apply only to free agents who control their actions and have it in their power, at the time of their actions, either to act rightly or not. According to Kant, this is just common sense. On the compatibilist view, as Kant understands it, I am free whenever the cause of my action is within me.
If we distinguish between involuntary convulsions and voluntary bodily movements, then on this view free actions are just voluntary bodily movements. The proximate causes of these movements are internal to the turnspit, the projectile, and the clock at the time of the movement. This cannot be sufficient for moral responsibility.
Why not? The reason, Kant says, is ultimately that the causes of these movements occur in time. Return to the theft example.
The thief decided to commit the theft, and his action flowed from this decision. If that cause too was an event occurring in time, then it must also have a cause beginning in a still earlier time, etc. All natural events occur in time and are thoroughly determined by causal chains that stretch backwards into the distant past.
So there is no room for freedom in nature, which is deterministic in a strong sense. The root of the problem, for Kant, is time. But the past is out of his control now, in the present.
Even if he could control those past events in the past, he cannot control them now. But in fact past events were not in his control in the past either if they too were determined by events in the more distant past, because eventually the causal antecedents of his action stretch back before his birth, and obviously events that occurred before his birth were never in his control. In that case, it would be a mistake to hold him morally responsible for it.
Compatibilism, as Kant understands it, therefore locates the issue in the wrong place. Even if the cause of my action is internal to me, if it is in the past — for example, if my action today is determined by a decision I made yesterday, or from the character I developed in childhood — then it is not within my control now. The real issue is not whether the cause of my action is internal or external to me, but whether it is in my control now.
For Kant, however, the cause of my action can be within my control now only if it is not in time. This is why Kant thinks that transcendental idealism is the only way to make sense of the kind of freedom that morality requires. Transcendental idealism allows that the cause of my action may be a thing in itself outside of time: namely, my noumenal self, which is free because it is not part of nature.
My noumenal self is an uncaused cause outside of time, which therefore is not subject to the deterministic laws of nature in accordance with which our understanding constructs experience. Many puzzles arise on this picture that Kant does not resolve. For example, if my understanding constructs all appearances in my experience of nature, not only appearances of my own actions, then why am I responsible only for my own actions but not for everything that happens in the natural world?
Moreover, if I am not alone in the world but there are many noumenal selves acting freely and incorporating their free actions into the experience they construct, then how do multiple transcendentally free agents interact? How do you integrate my free actions into the experience that your understanding constructs? Finally, since Kant invokes transcendental idealism to make sense of freedom, interpreting his thinking about freedom leads us back to disputes between the two-objects and two-aspects interpretations of transcendental idealism.
But applying the two-objects interpretation to freedom raises problems of its own, since it involves making a distinction between noumenal and phenomenal selves that does not arise on the two-aspects view. If only my noumenal self is free, and freedom is required for moral responsibility, then my phenomenal self is not morally responsible. But how are my noumenal and phenomenal selves related, and why is punishment inflicted on phenomenal selves?
We do not have theoretical knowledge that we are free or about anything beyond the limits of possible experience, but we are morally justified in believing that we are free in this sense. On the other hand, Kant also uses stronger language than this when discussing freedom. Our practical knowledge of freedom is based instead on the moral law.
So, on his view, the fact of reason is the practical basis for our belief or practical knowledge that we are free. Every human being has a conscience, a common sense grasp of morality, and a firm conviction that he or she is morally accountable. We may arrive at different conclusions about what morality requires in specific situations.
And we may violate our own sense of duty. But we all have a conscience, and an unshakeable belief that morality applies to us. It is just a ground-level fact about human beings that we hold ourselves morally accountable.
But Kant is making a normative claim here as well: it is also a fact, which cannot and does not need to be justified, that we are morally accountable, that morality does have authority over us. Kant holds that philosophy should be in the business of defending this common sense moral belief, and that in any case we could never prove or disprove it 4:459. Kant may hold that the fact of reason, or our consciousness of moral obligation, implies that we are free on the grounds that ought implies can.
In other words, Kant may believe that it follows from the fact that we ought morally to do something that we can or are able to do it. This is a hypothetical example of an action not yet carried out. On this view, to act morally is to exercise freedom, and the only way to fully exercise freedom is to act morally.
First, it follows from the basic idea of having a will that to act at all is to act on some principle, or what Kant calls a maxim. A maxim is a subjective rule or policy of action: it says what you are doing and why. We may be unaware of our maxims, we may not act consistently on the same maxims, and our maxims may not be consistent with one another.
But Kant holds that since we are rational beings our actions always aim at some sort of end or goal, which our maxim expresses. The goal of an action may be something as basic as gratifying a desire, or it may be something more complex such as becoming a doctor or a lawyer. If I act to gratify some desire, then I choose to act on a maxim that specifies the gratification of that desire as the goal of my action.
For example, if I desire some coffee, then I may act on the maxim to go to a cafe and buy some coffee in order to gratify that desire. Second, Kant distinguishes between two basic kinds of principles or rules that we can act on: what he calls material and formal principles. To act in order to satisfy some desire, as when I act on the maxim to go for coffee at a cafe, is to act on a material principle 5:21ff.
Here the desire for coffee fixes the goal, which Kant calls the object or matter of the action, and the principle says how to achieve that goal go to a cafe. A hypothetical imperative is a principle of rationality that says I should act in a certain way if I choose to satisfy some desire. If maxims in general are rules that describe how one does act, then imperatives in general prescribe how one should act.
An imperative is hypothetical if it says how I should act only if I choose to pursue some goal in order to gratify a desire 5:20. This, for example, is a hypothetical imperative: if you want coffee, then go to the cafe. This hypothetical imperative applies to you only if you desire coffee and choose to gratify that desire.
In contrast to material principles, formal principles describe how one acts without making reference to any desires. This is easiest to understand through the corresponding kind of imperative, which Kant calls a categorical imperative. A categorical imperative commands unconditionally that I should act in some way.
So while hypothetical imperatives apply to me only on the condition that I have and set the goal of satisfying the desires that they tell me how to satisfy, categorical imperatives apply to me no matter what my goals and desires may be. Kant regards moral laws as categorical imperatives, which apply to everyone unconditionally. For example, the moral requirement to help others in need does not apply to me only if I desire to help others in need, and the duty not to steal is not suspended if I have some desire that I could satisfy by stealing.
Moral laws do not have such conditions but rather apply unconditionally. That is why they apply to everyone in the same way. Third, insofar as I act only on material principles or hypothetical imperatives, I do not act freely, but rather I act only to satisfy some desire s that I have, and what I desire is not ultimately within my control.
To some limited extent we are capable of rationally shaping our desires, but insofar as we choose to act in order to satisfy desires we are choosing to let nature govern us rather than governing ourselves 5:118. We are always free in the sense that we always have the capacity to govern ourselves rationally instead of letting our desires set our ends for us. But we may freely fail to exercise that capacity.
Moreover, since Kant holds that desires never cause us to act, but rather we always choose to act on a maxim even when that maxim specifies the satisfaction of a desire as the goal of our action, it also follows that we are always free in the sense that we freely choose our maxims. Nevertheless, our actions are not free in the sense of being autonomous if we choose to act only on material principles, because in that case we do not give the law to ourselves, but instead we choose to allow nature in us our desires to determine the law for our actions. Finally, the only way to act freely in the full sense of exercising autonomy is therefore to act on formal principles or categorical imperatives, which is also to act morally.
Kant does not mean that acting autonomously requires that we take no account of our desires, which would be impossible 5:25, 61. This immediate consciousness of the moral law takes the following form: I have, for example, made it my maxim to increase my wealth by every safe means. Now I have a deposit in my hands, the owner of which has died and left no record of it.
Neither stars nor even galaxies would survive a disaster like this. If the second hypothesis is correct and dark energy is really a quintessence, then the future may hold a lot of amazing and unpleasant surprises. Story Saved You can find this story in My Bookmarks.
Канте прошёл вторую часть медобследования перед переходом в «Аль-Иттихад»
With an eye to Kant’s work, a philosopher and a sociologist argue that the Uber project robs drivers of their dignity. Иммануил Кант-немецкий философ, родоначальник немецкой классической философии, стоящий на грани эпох Просвещения и Романтизма. Полузащитник «Челси» Н’Голо Канте дал согласие на переход в миланский «Интер».
Собрались с мыслями. 300 лет Иммануилу Канту. В чем причины русского "антикантианства"? 25.04.2024
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